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Comment

Is Worship a Unique Subject or a Way of
Approaching Many Different Subjects?
Two Recent Decisions that Attempt to
Answer This Question Set the Second and
Ninth Circuits on a Course Toward State
Entanglement With Religion

I.

INTRODUCTION

Does exclusion of worship services from a limited public forum
constitute discrimination on the basis of viewpoint or subject matter?
Is worship a unique subject matter or a way of expressing views on
many different subjects? And if worship is a unique subject matter,
what expressive activities fall within that category? In other words,
what is the legal definition of worship?'

1. In Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of New York (Bronx Household
11), 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
presented its own list of questions that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Good
News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), left unanswered:
Would we be able to identify a form of religious worship that is divorced from the
teaching of moral values? Should we continue to evaluate activities that include

1319

1320

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

These are the questions that the United States Supreme Court's
seminal decision in Good News Club v. Milford Central School2 left
unanswered. Good News Club was a case from New York that involved
a constitutional challenge to the local school board's decision to bar a
Bible study group called the Good News Club from meeting on school
property after class.' The Court held that because (1) the school board
had opened school property to activities with the purpose of developing
the morals and character of students and (2) the activities of the Good
News Club fulfilled this purpose, the club could not be denied access
merely because it addressed this subject from a religious viewpoint. 4
While most of the reasoning the Court offered in support of its holding
in Good News Club was straightforward, the Court, in a footnote, made
one particularly vague and puzzling statement:
Despite Milford*s insistence that the
"religious worship," the Court of Appeals
It did compare the Club's activities
ultimately it concluded merely that the
the bounds of pure moral and character

Club's activities constitute
made no such determination.
to "religious worship," but
Club's activities "fall outside
development." In any event,

we conclude that the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious

worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values.'
To two courts, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the
Second Circuit, this passage indicated that the Supreme Court recognized a legal distinction, a sort of dichotomy, between religious worship

religious worship on a case-by-case basis, or should worship no longer be treated
as a distinct category of speech? How does the distinction drawn in our earlier
precedent between worship and other forms of speech from a religious viewpoint
relate to the dichotomy suggested in Good News Club between "mere" worship on
the one hand and worship that is not divorced from the teaching of moral values
on the other?
...[H]ow would the state, without imposing its own views on religion, define
which values are morally acceptable and which are not? And, if such a choice is
impossible to make, would the state be required to permit the use of public school
property by religious sects that preach ideas commonly viewed as hateful? When
several religious groups seek to use the same property at the same time, would
not the state have to choose between them? What criteria would govern that
choice? In all of this process, is there not a danger of excessive entanglement by
the state in religion?
Bronx Household 11, 331 F.3d at 355.
2. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
3. Id. at 102-04.
4. Id. at 108-10.
5. Id. at 112 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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and speech from a religious viewpoint addressed to at least one of a
limited public forum's permitted topics.
From this premise that worship is distinguishable from speech
addressing a secular topic from a religious perspective, the Ninth
Circuit, in Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover,6 and
the Second Circuit, in Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education
of New York (Bronx Household III),' both held that worship is a distinct
category of speech that may be excluded from a limited public forum on
the basis of subject matter.8 However, neither court crafted or cited a
workable legal definition of this worship category of speech. Instead,
both courts relied on the fact that the parties in both cases described
their activities as worship.9 Thus, while future courts may look to these
cases as precedent for the proposition that worship is a category of
speech that the government may exclude from a limited public forum on
the basis of subject matter, they will find that these cases offer little
guidance on how to identify what speech falls within this worship
category, short of relying on a group's self-description of its activities.
In the inevitable case of a group that does not describe its activities as
worship, the door is now open for a district court within the Second or
Ninth Circuit to conduct a probing, unguided inquiry into the religious
activities of private individuals. This presents a real danger of state
entanglement in religion.
In addition to the conclusion that worship is legally distinguishable
from other religious speech on the basis of subject matter, one other
similarity between these two cases is the state officials' shared motive
for denying these groups access to the forum. The state officials were
concerned that an objective observer of the groups' expressive activities
would perceive a state endorsement of religion.' ° In other words, they
argued that these content-based speech restrictions were necessary to
avoid an Establishment Clause" violation under the Endorsement Test
approach.' 2 Thus, these cases illustrate the purported tension between
the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the First

6. 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2007).
7. 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
8. Id. at 102 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 918.
9. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 101-02 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr.
Church, 480 F.3d at 918 & n.18.
10. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 105 n.8 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr.
Church, 480 F.3d at 910-11.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Amendment, 13 as well as the ongoing debate over whether private
speech on public property can violate the Establishment Clause.
Section II of this Comment provides an overview of forum analysis,
which is crucial to these decisions. This anslysis is vital because the
category (or, in the Court's language, "fora") a government-owned
property falls into determines the sort of speech restrictions the
government may impose. For example, the government may impose
subject-matter-based restrictions on speech in a limited public forum or
nonpublic forum, not in a traditional public forum or designated public
forum. Section III describes the Lemon test14 and looks at different
approaches to the Establishment Clause. Section IV examines the
battleground for most First Amendment challenges to restrictions on
speech in a limited public forum: public schools. The line of cases
dealing with religious groups seeking access to public schools best
illustrates the methodology of forum analysis and how courts have dealt
with the conflict between the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Section V analyzes Good News
Club, the case representing the culmination of the line of cases
addressing the access of religious groups to schools. Section VI covers
the recent decisions in Faith Center Church and Bronx Household III
that purport to recognize worship as a distinct subject matter. Section
VII considers the implications of these two decisions and suggests that
the courts should steer away from the course set by these two decisions.
Finally, Section VIII presents the conclusions of the analysis.

II.

FIRST AMENDMENT FORUM ANALYSIS: THE CLASSIFICATION OF

GOVERNMENT-OWNED PROPERTY DETERMINES THE TYPE OF SPEECH
RESTRICTIONS THAT THE STATE MAY IMPOSE

The First Amendment's protection of expression from government
restriction is not absolute.1" Certain categories of expressive activity
are not protected from government restriction (so long as these
restrictions are viewpoint neutral), such as obscenity, fighting words,
and incitement. 16 On any government-owned property, expression
falling into these categories may be restricted.17 For expressive activity
that does not fall into these categories and that occurs on governmentowned property, the level of protection the expressive activity receives

13.
14.
15.
16.
(1969).
17.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
See Cohen, 403 U.S. 15; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
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depends on the classification of that government-owned property."8 The
Court terms these classes of government-owned property "fora."'9
In both of the cases examined here, the government-owned property
involved was classified as a limited public forum. 20 Therefore, an
understanding of the nature of a limited public forum is necessary to
make sense of the analysis in these cases.21
Limited public fora are a subset of designated public fora.
In a
limited public forum, the government opens a nonpublic forum only to
certain groups or certain topics and purposes. 2 The government may

18. See Kevin Fiet, Note, The Bronx Household of Faith:Looking at the Unanswered
Questions, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 153.
19. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
20. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. (Bronx Household III), 492 F.3d
89, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic
Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 910 (9th Cir. 2007).
21. In addition to a limited public forum, First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes
a number of other public and non-public fora. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. There are two
other types of traditional public fora. Id. One is the traditional public forum. Id.
Traditional public fora are places such as streets, parks, and sidewalks that by long
tradition have been devoted to assembly and debate. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). In a traditional public forum, the government
may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech so long as they are
content-neutral. Id. To be content-neutral, the restriction must not discriminate on the
basis of subject matter or viewpoint. See id. at 49. Any restriction on speech in a
traditional public forum that is not content-neutral must be "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest." Id. at 45. In other words, a content-based restriction on speech
in a traditional public forum is enforceable only if it passes strict scrutiny.
No government action is necessary to establish a traditional public forum. Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). However, another type of
public forum, a designated public forum, is established when the government intentionally
dedicates government property to expressive activity. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
Thus, unlike a traditional public forum, a designated public forum cannot be created in the
absence of government action. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. However, what the government
giveth, the government may take away. Unlike a traditional public forum, the government
may convert a designated public forum into a nonpublic forum. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S.
at 46.
Once the government establishes a designated public forum, any restrictions on
expressive activity within the forum must pass the same scrutiny as restrictions on speech
in a traditional public forum. Id. This means that only reasonable content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions, or content-based restrictions that pose strict scrutiny, are
constitutional. Id. Nonpublic fora, unlike the various types of public fora, are not by
tradition or designation open for the public's expressive activities. Id. In a non-public
forum, a restriction on speech must be reasonable but may be content-based. Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992). However, even in a nonpublic
forum, a speech restriction must be viewpoint neutral. Id.
22. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 626 (2d Cir. 2005).
23. Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001).

1324

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

restrict certain expression in a limited public forum on the basis of

subject matter or topic so long as this content-based restriction is
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum.24
However, "once the government 'allows expressive activities of a certain
genre, it25 may not selectively deny access for other activities of that
genre."'
III.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

ONE CLAUSE, MANY TESTS

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment simply states:
26
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
Efforts to interpret and apply this little phrase have divided the
Supreme Court into several camps that each propound different
approaches to the Establishment Clause. With the recent additions to
the bench, it will be interesting to see which test prevails.
A.

Lemon Test
The oldest recognized test, the much-maligned and criticized Lemon
test, was announced by Chief Justice Berger in Lemon v. Kurtzman.25
It is a three-part test that provides: (1) "[T]he statute must have a
secular legislative purpose"; (2) "[The statute's] principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and (3)
"[T]he statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion. ' '29 Although still officially a three-part test, as Justice
O'Connor observed in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,° the Court has in
practice "folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect
inquiry."3
Some Supreme Court Justices would like to see this test discarded.
Among them, none is more vehement (and vituperative) in expressing
disdain for this test than Justice Scalia. In Justice Scalia's view, the
test is applied in an arbitrary and unprincipled way. He contends that
the Court invokes the test to strike down government practices it does
24. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Bronx Household
III, 492 F.3d at 97 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Peck, 426 F.3d at 626.
25. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 97 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (quoting Travis v.
Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991)).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. For an in depth discussion of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence see
Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudenceof the Establishment
Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 77 (2007).
28. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
30. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
31. Id. at 668.
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not support but simply ignores the test when it would forbid a government action it does support. 2 In particular, Justice Scalia finds the
purpose prong of the test to be illogical and unworkable. As he
explained in Church of the LukumiBabalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,"
"[I]t is virtually impossible to determine the singular 'motive' of a
collective legislative body, and this Court has a long tradition of
refraining from such inquiries."3 4 Despite all the criticism (and even
vitriol) at the Lemon test over the years, the test survives as the official
standard for determining whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause.35
Endorsement Test
While not an official test, the endorsement test has garnered the
support of a majority of Supreme Court Justices in a number of
decisions.3 The endorsement test is credited to Justice O'Connor who
used it to determine the constitutionality of a display of Christmas
37
symbolic objects in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.
Justice O'Connor described her test best in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette,8 a case concerning a private display of
religious symbols in a government-owned public forum. 9 In her
concurrence in that case, she asserted that under the endorsement test,
a private display in a government-owned public forum violates the
Establishment Clause if a reasonable observer who is aware of the
history and context of the community and forum in which the display
appears would perceive a government endorsement of religion. ° Thus,
with this requirement of a highly informed, reasonable person, Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test approach sets a high threshold for when
B.

32. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400
(Scalia, J., concurring).
33. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
34. Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
35. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398-99; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.

290 (2000).
36. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,757 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
37. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
39. Id. at 757-59.
40. Id. at 777, 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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private expression on government property can violate the Establishment Clause.41
Other Justices embrace a less demanding endorsement test approach.
Among them is Justice Stevens, who, in his dissent in Capitol Square,
said that an Establishment Clause violation exists when a reasonable
person-even a person without an awareness of the general history and
context of the community in which the display appears-would perceive
a government endorsement of religion.42 While Justice Stevens's
version of the endorsement test sets a higher threshold for an Establishment Clause violation than Justice O'Connor's version, the implication
of both these tests is the same: private religious expression in a public
forum may violate the Establishment Clause.
Therefore, the government may be justified in imposing content-based
restrictions on private religious speech in a public forum to prevent a
violation of the Establishment Clause. As this Comment discusses
below, under a version of Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's coercion
test,43 private religious expression in a government-owned public forum,
no matter how it is perceived by observers, will never violate the
Establishment Clause. Therefore, under the coercion test, the government is never justified in imposing content-based restrictions on private
religious speech in a public forum.
C.

Coercion Test

Unlike the Lemon and endorsement tests, the coercion test has never
garnered the support of a majority of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless,
a number of Justices do adhere to the coercion test, so examination of
this test is worthwhile. The two major versions of the coercion test
consider whether the government "coerces" a person to engage in a
religious activity. Both agree that direct compulsion to engage in a
religious activity backed by the force of law violates the Establishment
Clause. Where they differ is on whether subtle, psychological coercion
amounts to a violation of the Establishment Clause.44
Under Justice Kennedy's version, sometimes called the psychological
coercion test, coercion that comes in the more subtle form of public or

41. See William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986). Marshall observes that under Justice
O'Connor's dndorsement test approach, "Establishment is no more than what the Justices
perceive it to be" because "perception is not susceptible to definitive or objective
interpretation." Id. at 537.
42. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 593 (majority opinion); Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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peer pressure may be enough to violate the Establishment Clause.4 5
Indeed, he found this to be the case in Lee v. Weisman,46 where the
court held that a graduation prayer that was incorporated, under the
direction of the principal, into an official public school graduation
ceremony violated the Establishment Clause because of the pressure it
placed upon students attending the school-sanctioned event to engage in
this religious activity.47 Justice Scalia's version of the coercion test,
which he described in his dissent in Lee (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, and White), says that only government
compulsion to engage in a religious activity backed by "force of law and
threat of penalty" constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause.48
Despite this important difference between these two versions of the
coercion test, they share one thing in common: non-compelled private
religious speech in a government-owned public forum never violates the
Establishment Clause. Thus, under the coercion test, a person would
never need to worry that his private religious speech in a public forum
might be perceived as government speech and, therefore, be subject to
content-based restriction. 49
Justice Thomas is generally believed to favor the coercion test because
he joined Justice Scalia's in his dissent in Lee, which is perhaps the
50
clearest articulation of Justice Scalia's version of the coercion test.
However, when he wrote for the majority in Good News Club v. Milford
Central School,51 Justice Thomas used the endorsement test as well as

45. Id. at 593 (majority opinion).
46. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
47. Id. at 581, 597. Justice Kennedy took great pains to emphasize that the speech at
issue in Lee was not private religious speech.
A school official, the principal, decided that an invocation and a benediction should
be given; this is a choice attributable to the state .... The principal chose the
religious participant, here a rabbi, and that choice is attributable to the state ....
.... Principal lee provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of the "Guidelines for
Civic Occasions," and advised him that his prayers should be nonsectarian.
Id. at 587-88.
48. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
49. For more on how the coercion test may provide better protection to private religious
speech on government-owned property, see Antony Barone Kolenc,"Mr. Scalia's
Neighborhoood": A Home For Minority Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 819 (2007); Jason
E. Manning, Comment, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: Viewpoint Discrimination or Endorsement of Religion?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833, 883 (2003) ("[Under the
coercion test, i]f the speaker is private, and if the state treats the religious speaker
neutrally, then the Establishment Clause is not implicated.").
50. Lee, 505 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
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the coercion test to analyze the Establishment Clause issue.5 2 Does
this suggest that Justice Thomas supports the endorsement test rather
than the coercion test? Or did he employ the endorsement test simply
because he knew it would garner a majority? My guess is the latter.

IV. A BATTLEGROUND IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FREE SPEECH
AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES: RELIGIOUS GROUP'S ACCESS TO PUBLIC
SCHOOL FACILITIES

For several decades religious groups have sought access to school
facilities. The efforts of these groups to obtain access have placed school
boards in the difficult position of trying to respect the free speech rights
of these groups while avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.53 In a line of cases, the Supreme Court has
sought to supply school boards and lower courts with some guidance on
how to navigate between these two constitutional concerns.
The first significant case to address the issue of government restriction
of religious groups' access to school facilities was Widmar v. Vincent.54
In Widmar the Board of Curators for the University of Missouri at
Kansas City (the "University") decided to prohibit Cornerstone, a
religious group, from using campus classrooms and the student center
for meetings pursuant to a school regulation that provided: "No
University buildings or grounds ... may be used for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent
groups." 5 The University's decision was upheld by the district court,
but later reversed by the court of appeals.5 6 The Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals decision and declared the University's
policy to be unconstitutional. 7
In reaching its decision, the Court first ascertained the type of forum
involved." The Court stated that the University's policy of opening
classrooms and other facilities for use by student groups had created a
public forum by designation. 9 In managing this public forum, the
University could only regulate speech on the basis of content if "its
regulation [was] necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ...

52.
53.
54.

Id. at 113-19.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).

55. Id. at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 267-69.
Id. at 267.
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narrowly drawn to achieve that end."60 In other words, to avoid
invalidation, the University's content-based regulation had to overcome
strict scrutiny.
The University argued that the compelling state interest that made
the exclusion of Cornerstone necessary was the avoidance of an
Establishment Clause violation.6 ' The Court agreed but, applying the
Lemon test, held that permitting the Cornerstone student group to use
campus facilities for its meetings and worship services would not violate
the Establishment Clause. 2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
agreed with the district court and the court of appeals that the first and
third prongs of the test were easily met because "an open-forum policy,
including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a
secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with religion."6 8 The
controversy, therefore, lay with the second prong of the test, which asks
whether allowing religious groups access to the public forum would have
the primary effect of advancing religion.6 4
The Court determined that opening the public forum to all forms of
discourse, including Cornerstone's religious meetings and worship
services, would not have the primary effect of advancing religion. 5 To
reach this conclusion, the Court stated that two factors were especially
relevant."6 First, the Court noted that "an open forum in a public
university does not confer any imprimatur of a state approval on
religious sects or practices."67 The Court observed that university
students are young adults who, unlike more impressionable younger
students, could "appreciate that the University's policy [was] one of
neutrality toward religion" and were unlikely to draw an inference of
University support for Cornerstone's message merely from the fact that
the group met on campus.66 Second, the Court determined it to be
significant that more than 100 religious and nonreligious student
organizations used campus facilities for meetings.6 9 With so many
different groups meeting, it was unlikely that religious groups would

60. Id. at 270.
61. Id. at 270-71.
62. Id. at 271-73. For a discussion of the Lemon test see supra notes 28-35 and
accompanying text.
63. Id. at 271-72 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 272.
65. Id. at 273.
66. Id. at 274-75.
67. Id. at 274.
68. Id. at 274 n.14.
69. Id. at 274-75.
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come to dominate the forum; therefore, the primary effect of opening the
forum would not be the advancement of religion.7 °
The lone dissenter in Widmar was Justice White, who argued that the
Court should, as the University attempted to do, recognize a distinction
between discussion about religious beliefs and verbal acts of worship.7 1
This distinction, if recognized, would have rendered the University policy
constitutional. 2 Justice White countered the majority's contention that
such a distinction cannot be made by pointing out that the Court had
already made content-based distinctions in Establishment Clause cases
in other areas. 3
For instance, in Stone v. Graham,4 the Court struck down a law
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments on classroom walls. 5
In Stone the Court based its decision on the religious content of the Ten
Commandments. 6 Similarly, the Court's decisions in school prayer
cases are based on a content-based distinction between the verbal act of
Lastly, in Torcaso v. Watkins,75
worship and other types of speech.
the Court struck down a state requirement that a person seeking state
employment declare a belief in God. 79 The Court in Torcaso found a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause based on the content of the speech
at issue.8' According to Justice White, in these cases the Court made
the sort of content-based distinctions that the majority in Widmar
claimed were not possible for a court to make."' Justice White forcefully contended that if the majority was correct in stating that no
distinction could be made between speech discussing religious belief and
worship, then "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form
of speech.""2

70. Id.
71. Id. at 283-84 & 284 nn.l-2 (White, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 286.
73. Id. at 284-85.
74. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
75. Id. at 41.
76. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 285 (White, J., dissenting) ('That case necessarily presumed
that the State could not ignore the religious content of the written message, nor was it
permitted to treat that content as it would, or must, treat, other-secular-messages under
the First Amendment's protection of speech.").
77. Id.
78. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
79. Id. at 495.
80. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 285 (White, J., dissenting) ("[lit was the content of the speech
that brought the case within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.").
81. Id. at 285-86.
82. Id. at 284.
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Justice Powell responded to Justice White's arguments in his majority
opinion in Widmar.83 He offered three reasons explaining why speech
acts that constitute worship could not be distinguished from speech
about religion.' First, he argued that the distinction between discussion of religious beliefs and worship has no "intelligible content." 5 As
Justice Powell explained, "There is no indication when 'singing hymns,
reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles' cease to be 'singing,
teaching, and reading-all apparently forms of 'speech,' despite their
religious subject matter-and become unprotected 'worship.'" 6 Second,
even if the Court could draw a line, Justice Powell doubted that the
judiciary would be competent to administer it. 87 Justice Powell
explained that courts would have "to inquire into the significance of
words and practices to different religious faiths," and that such an
inquiry "would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a
manner forbidden by [previous Supreme Court] cases."' Third, Justice
Powell argued that Justice White failed to establish the relevance of the
distinction between religious speech acts and speech about religion. 9
According to Justice Powell, Justice White "g[ave] no reason why the
Establishment Clause ... would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts than for religious worship by
persons already converted."9 °
After the Court in Widmar resolved the question of whether a public
forum on a university campus could impose a content-based restriction
on religious speech and exclude religious student groups, the question
remained whether the Widmar holding would extend to secondary
schools. In Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools v.
92
Mergens,9" the Court answered in the affirmative.
The first part of Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Mergens
93
involved a statutory analysis of the Equal Access Act (the "Act")
which the Court acknowledged basically codified the holding in Widmar
and applied it to secondary public schools that receive federal fund-

83.

Id. at 269 n.6 (majority opinion).

84.

Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 283 (White, J., dissenting)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 235-36.
20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000).
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ing.94 Essentially, the Act mandated that schools which received
federal funding and maintained a limited public forum could not deny
access to students who wished to use the forum on the basis of the
content of their speech.95 The question was whether the obligations
that the Act imposed on secondary schools constituted an Establishment
Clause violation because the Act forced schools to allow religion-oriented
student groups to meet despite the possibility that such meetings might
be perceived by other students as an endorsement by the school of these
groups particular religious beliefs.96 The Court held that the Act did
not violate the Establishment Clause.97
To reach this holding, the Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for a
plurality of four Justices, applied the Lemon test, as the majority had in
Widmar.9" Also, like in Widmar, the plurality held that the Act's policy
of nondiscrimination toward the political, philosophical, or religious
content of the speech easily satisfied both the secular purpose and
entanglement prongs of the three-prong Lemon test.99 The secular
purpose prong was met despite the possible religious motive of some of
the legislators who supported the Act because what ultimately matters
is the legislative purpose of the statute."'
The clear legislative
purpose of the Act, as the plurality saw it, was to grant equal access to
those who wished to engage in secular and religious speech, which is an
"undeniably secular" purpose.' 0 ' As for the entanglement prong, the
provisions in the Act that prohibited faculty members who served as
monitors of the groups from participating in the student-initiated
religious meetings and the provisions that prohibited school sponsorship
of any religious meetings were held to be adequate measures for
preventing state entanglement with religion." 2
Thus, the issue, as in Widmar, lay with the primary effect prong of the
Lemon test.0 3 To distinguish Widmar, the school board emphasized
the differences between the circumstances in this case and those in
Widmar.' °4 The school board argued that unlike the university setting
in Widmar, where enrollment was voluntary and religious meetings at

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Mergens, 496 U.S. at 234-35.
Id. at 235-38.
Id. at 247-48.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 248-53.
Id. at 248-49, 252-53.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 249-52.
Id. at 249.
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issue were not sponsored by the school, the "student religious meetings"
in this case were "held under school aegis" in a public secondary school
where enrollment and attendance were compulsory under state law.1" 5
Invoking the Endorsement Test, the school board contended that these
circumstances would lead "an objective observer in the position of a
secondary school student [to] perceive official school support for such
religious meetings." 1°'
The plurality disagreed with the school board for three reasons.0 7
First, it reasoned that secondary school students were mature enough to
understand that by allowing student groups to meet to discuss religion,
the school did not endorse the speech and religious views of these
groups.'
Justice O'Connor asserted, "The proposition that schools do
not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated," and it was
as easy for high school students to understand as it was for the college
students in Widmar, who were only a few years older.10 9 Second, the
provisions in the Act that limited participation by school officials in the
meetings of student-initiated groups sufficiently reduced the likelihood
that other school students might perceive the school as endorsing a
particular religion."0
The plurality acknowledged that permitting
these religious student groups to meet might exert peer pressure on
other students to participate, but the plurality did not think that the
students would ever perceive this peer pressure as a state endorsement
of religion or state coercion to participate in religious activity."'
Third, the plurality noted that the "broad spectrum" of student-initiated
clubs and the fact that students at the school were free to create
additional student clubs mitigated any chance that students would
perceive an official endorsement of a particular religion." 2 Thus,
applying the Endorsement Test, the plurality held that because no
reasonable person would perceive the after school meetings of studentinitiated groups as a state endorsement of religion, there was no
compelling reason to prohibit these meetings. 1 3
Writing for the
plurality, Justice O'Connor said that, in short, "We think the logic of
Widmar applies with equal force to the Equal Access Act.""'

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 250-53.
at 250.
at 251.
at 252.
at 253.
at 248.

1334

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a concurring opinion,
to explain why he could not "join all that [was] said" in Justice
5
O'Connor's Establishment Clause analysis of the Equal Access Act."
In this separate opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that he used a
different approach than Justice O'Connor and the three justices who
joined her analysis. 116 While Justice O'Connor considered whether the
Act might lead a reasonable student to perceive a school endorsement of
religion, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court instead needed only to
apply two principles." 7
The first principle was that the government may not give direct
benefits to a religious faith."18 Justice Kennedy determined, as did the
plurality, that all benefits to a religious faith were incidental and not
direct."
Therefore, the Act did not give direct benefits to a religious
faith. 20 The second principle was that the government may not coerce
a student to participate in a religious activity. 2' Because the Act did
not compel any student to participate in or attend any of these studentinitiated meetings, the government could not be said to have coerced any
student to participate in religious activity.1 22 Therefore, the Act did
not violate the Establishment Clause because it did not directly benefit
a religious faith or allow schools to coerce students to participate in
religious activity.' 2 '
Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice
Brennan to highlight what he felt were the salient differences between
Widmar and this case and to emphasize what steps the school must take
to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.' 24 To Justice Marshall,
one crucial difference was that unlike the university in Widmar that
took "concrete steps to ensure" that it would not be identified with
student organizations, Westside High School promoted its student
organizations as vital components in its mission to develop citizenSuch promotion, Justice Marshall argued, increased the
ship. 25

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 258-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 258.
at 260.

at 260.
at
at
at
at

261.
260-62.
262-63 (Marshall, J., concurring).
266-67.
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likelihood that a reasonable student would perceive the school as
endorsing a religion.126
Another important difference Justice Marshall discerned between the
educational institutions at issue in Widmar and this case was the
number of ideological clubs. 2 ' In Widmar the university had a wide
range of ideological and advocacy-oriented clubs. 12
This broad
diversity minimized any chance that students would perceive the school
as endorsing any one club's activities over another.'29 In Mergens
however, the school had only one ideological and advocacy-oriented
club. 3' Because the school had this one religious club, but no other
political or ideological organizations, the risk that students might
perceive
the school as endorsing this club's objectives and viewpoint was
13 1
high.

To avoid the perception of endorsement, Justice Marshall recommended that the school take steps beyond those that the Act required to make
clear that the school did not endorse the views of the club. 132 He
suggested that the school should "entirely discontinue encouraging
student participation in clubs.''
Or, if the school refused to withdraw its general endorsement of student organizations, then it 34should
"affirmatively disclaim any endorsement of the Christian club."
While Widmar and Mergens dealt with the access of religion-oriented
student organizations to a public school's limited public forum, Lamb's
Chapel v.Center Moriches Union Free School District135 concerned the
access of an outside religious organization to a public school's limited
public forum.13 6 Because this case involved an outside religious
organization using public school facilities, it may be the Supreme Court
case that is most factually similar to Bronx Household of Faith v. Board
of Education of New York. 137 In Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical church,
Lamb's Chapel sought access to public school property during nonschool
hours to present a film series dealing with family and child-rearing

126. Id. at 267.
127. Id. at 268.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 269-70.
133. Id. at 270.
134. Id.
135. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
136. Id. at 387.
137. 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
accompanying text.

This case is discussed infra notes 302-69 and
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issues from a Christian perspective. 3 ' Lamb's Chapel's request for
access was denied by the school district, which cited its own rule that
provided that "school premises shall not be used by any group for
religious purposes."' 39
The Court held that the School Distritt's decision discriminated
against Lamb's Chapel on the basis of viewpoint and violated the Free
To reach this conclusion,
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. "'
the Court, as it did in Widmar and Mergens, first ascertained the
category of forum involved.'
The Court assumed for the sake of
argument that the school was a limited public forum.'4 2 Quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund,4 ' the Court
reasoned that the District could exclude from the forum a group that
"'wishe[d] to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the
forum,"' but that it would "'violate[] the First Amendment [if] it denie[d]
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view [it] espouses on
an otherwise includible subject.""4 4 Among the includible subjects in
this forum were family and child-rearing issues.'4 5 Because Lamb's
Chapel wished to conduct a presentation on these topics, the Court held
that under the First Amendment, Lamb's Chapel could not be excluded
on the basis of its Christian viewpoint. 4 '
The Court also addressed the school district's argument that its
decision to deny the church access was justified by the school district's
interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation.'47 The Court
held that, as in Widmar, there was no realistic danger that the
community would perceive the school district as endorsing a particular
religion, that any benefit to the Church would be no more than
incidental, and that application of the Lemon test revealed that 4"posited
8
fears of an Establishment Clause violation [were] unfounded.'

138. 508 U.S. at 387-88.
139. Id. at 387, 388-89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. at 393-94; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
141. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390-92.
142. Id. at 391-92. The lower courts had both determined that the school was a limited
public forum. Id. at 390. The Court said that Lamb's Chapel's argument to the contrary
had "considerable force," but declined to rule on the question because the answer was
irrelevant to its holding. Id. at 391-92.
143. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
144. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
145. Id. at 393-94.
146. Id. at 394.
147. Id. at 394-95.
148. Id. at 395.
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As in Mergens, Justices Kennedy and Scalia concurred in the judgment
but not in the analysis.'49 Once again, Justice Kennedy and Justice
Scalia, who was joined by Justice Thomas, rejected the endorsement test
and called for adoption of the coercion test.150 Moreover, Justice Scalia
wrote a concurrence that was joined by Justice Thomas that called for
a rejection of both the Lemon test and the endorsement test, and it
called for those tests to be replaced with the simple principle that
permitting all viewpoints access to a forum for private religious
expressive activity can never signify state "embrace of a particular
religious sect" and, therefore, can never constitute a violation of the
Establishment Clause.15 '
Thus, the Court in Widmar held that in a designated public forum on
a public university campus, the government could not discriminate
against a group with a religious viewpoint. The Court in Mergens
extended this holding to students in a public secondary school. Then in
Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that outside groups could not be denied
access to a public school's limited public forum on the basis of their
religious viewpoint. So the stage was set for Good News Club v. Milford
Central School,'5' a case in which a group of elementary school
students sought access to classrooms during nonschool hours for Bible
studies directed by adult group leaders who were not part of the school
faculty."'

V. THE CULMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
RELIGIOUS GROUP'S ACCESS TO SCHOOL FACILITIES: GOOD NEWS CLUB
V. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL

Good News Club v. Milford Central School"' concerned a New York
statute that allowed use of public school facilities after hours for, among
other things, meetings that addressed the subject of morals and
character development. 155 Pursuant to this statute, two nonfaculty
adults who were the local sponsors of the Good News Club sought
permission to hold the club's weekly after-school meetings in the school
cafeteria. 156 Their request, however, was denied on the ground that
the club's activities were the equivalent of religious worship, and

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 508 U.S. 384, 397-401 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 508 U.S. 384, 397-401 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 397-401 (Scalia, J., concurring).
533 U.S. 98 (2001).
Id. at 103.
533 U.S. 98 (2001).
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2000); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102, 104.
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 103.
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according to one of the school's community use policies, school facilities
could not be used for religious purposes." 7
The club's activities
included singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture,
inviting the unsaved children to accept Christ as their savior, and
imploring the saved children to obey Jesus and spread his message."'
The Milford Board of Education argued that because religious worship
was not among the uses of school property that the statute permitted,
the board could legally prohibit the club from meeting on school
159
property.
The sponsors of the club and others filed an action in district court
challenging the board's decision as a violation of their free speech rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 6 ° The board's motion
for summary judgment was granted by the district court and affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 16 ' The
Second Circuit held that the club's expressive activities were subject
matter of a "'quintessentially religious"' nature that fell "'outside the
bounds of pure moral and character development'" and that the school's
policy was a reasonable subject matter restriction in light of the forum's
62
purposes. 1
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.'63 In a
majority opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the
denial of the club's application to use school premises for its meetings
constituted viewpoint discrimination that violated the club's free speech
rights under the First Amendment."
To reach this decision, the
Court first had to identify the type of forum at issue.'65 This was
easily accomplished because both sides agreed that the school property
was a limited public forum. 66 Within its limited public forum, the
school board could restrict speech to certain topics so long as the topic
restriction was "'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the

157. Id.
158. Id. at 103 (majority opinion), 123 (Scalia, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 103-04.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 104.
161. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 104-05.
162. Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510, 511 (2d Cir. 2000)).
163. Id. at 120.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 106.
166. Id.

2008]

DEFINING WORSHIP

1339

forum.'' 1 7 However, the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that the school board may not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint. 168 Thus, once the school board opened the forum
for discussion of a topic or, in other words, to speech with content that
pertains to a certain topic, it had to permit speech from all viewpoints
pertaining to that topic.
After identifying the type of forum, the issue was whether the school
board's decision of the school was content-based or viewpoint discrimination. 169 The Court held that the subject matter addressed in the club's
meetings pertained to one of the topics that the school board had opened
the forum to, namely, morals and character development. 7 ° Because
the subject matter of the Club's speech fell within one of the listed
topics, the Court determined that the decision to exclude the Club did
not constitute topic discrimination but rather constituted viewpoint
discrimination. 7 ' Specifically, the Court held that the school board
discriminated against the club's religious viewpoint on the topic of moral
and character development.7 2
Prohibiting the club to meet only
because it had a 173
religious viewpoint on the topic, the Court held, was
unconstitutional.
Because the Court held that the board's decision to deny meeting
space to the club constituted viewpoint discrimination, the Court never
addressed the reasonableness of any content-based discrimination in
light of the purposes of the school's forum.' 74 The Court's decision not
to address this issue would be important in Faith Center Church
Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover175 and Bronx Household of Faith v.
Board of Education of New York (Bronx Household II).171 In both
cases, the courts of appeals determined that worship was a unique
subject.'7 7 Once worship was found to be a distinct subject, these
courts could then analyze whether the subject matter-based exclusion of

167. Id. at 106-07 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985)).
168. Id. at 106.
169. Id. at 107.
170. Id. at 108.
171. Id. at 109-10.
172. Id. at 111-12.
173. Id. at 112.
174. Id. at 107.
175. 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2007).
176. 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
177. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 102 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr. Church,
480 F.3d at 918.
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worship from the limited public forum was reasonable in light of the
purposes of the forum.
Perhaps most important to the courts of appeals reasoning in Faith
Center Church and Bronx Household was the language in footnote four
of the majority opinion in Good News Club in which the Court stated,
"[W]e conclude that the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious
worship divorced from any teaching of moral values."178 To some of
the judges in the Second and Ninth Circuits, this language suggests that
worship lies in a separate speech category.'79 In other words, the
implication of this language, according to these judges, is that the First
Amendment prevents the government from discriminating against
speech because the speech conveys a religious viewpoint on one of the
limited public forum's permitted topics; however, the government may,
under the First Amendment, restrict religious speech that is in itself
worship, so long as this restriction is reasonable in light of the purposes
of the forum.
The Court in Good News Club also addressed the board's argument
that its policy was necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause
violation. 80 In analyzing the Establishment Clause issue, the Court
81
applied elements of both the coercion test and the endorsement test.'
Applying the coercion test, the Court noted that students were not
obligated to attend the club's meetings and that the meetings did not
receive any sponsorship or direction from the school."8 2 Furthermore,
parental permission was required, thus placing a barrier to any coercive
pressure to attend the club's meetings.8 3 Applying the endorsement
test, the Court noted that the group meetings were never led by faculty
members and occurred after school hours in a resource room shared with
the high school and middle school, rather than in an elementary school
classroom."
Together, these facts minimized the possibility of a
reasonable student perceiving school endorsement of the club's activities.
The Court acknowledged that there was some risk a student might
perceive the school as endorsing the club's religious activities; however,
there were countervailing free speech and free exercise constitutional
concerns that outweighed this risk.8 5

178. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4.
179. Bronx Household, 492 F.3d at 102 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Faith Ctr. Church,
480 F.3d at 918.
180. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13.
181. Id. at 115, 117-18.
182. Id. at 115.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 117-18.
185. Id. at 119.
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Justice Scalia concurred in both the judgment and the majority
opinion but wrote separately to further explain his views on the
Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause issues addressed in this
case.1 86 First, on the Establishment Clause issue, Justice Scalia
expressed his view that if the government entity that controls a limited
public forum gives nondiscriminatory access to the forum, then there can
be no Establishment Clause violation because such a neutral position
toward religion cannot "'signify state or local embrace of a particular
religious sect.' 187 Justice Scalia's view departs from the position
taken by the majority, that government neutrality toward religion is but
one "'significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face
of [an] Establishment Clause attack."' 8 8 To Justice Scalia this fact is
dispositive; if the government permits all viewpoints access to a public
forum, then an Establishment Clause violation is impossible.' 8 9
As for the Free Speech Clause issues, Justice Scalia observed that
much of the religious speech the dissent found objectionable was a
discussion of the religious premises that serve as the foundation for the
club's viewpoint on morality and character development.' 90 Justice
Scalia pointed out that a speaker's expression of his viewpoint on a topic
has only limited value if the speaker is not also free to explain and
defend the premise of his viewpoint on a topic."' Furthermore, no
other group that also used this forum for discussions on this topic was
prohibited by the school board from discussing the premise or reasons for
its viewpoint, so why should the school board prohibit the Good News
club from discussing the premise for its viewpoint merely because that
premise is religious?'9 2 Justice Scalia contended that to impose this
restriction on only the club and on none of the other student organizations would93 violate the First Amendment requirement of viewpoint
1
neutrality.

Also, Justice Scalia attacked the dissent's efforts to defend the school
board's decision as content discrimination rather than viewpoint
discrimination.' 94 According to Justice Scalia, in the dissent's view,

186. Id. at 120-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 121 (quoting Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
188. Id. at 114 (majority opinion) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Regents of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995)).
189. Id. at 121 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 123.
191. Id. at 124-25.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 125-26.
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the school board could prohibit speech with content that had more than
an embedded religious viewpoint but was itself worship.195 Justice
Scalia skewered the whole notion that the Court could make this sort of
content-based distinction.196 The main reason for his rejection of the
dissent's approach was that it would require the Court to develop a legal
definition of worship.' 97 Justice Scalia asserted that crafting a definition of worship was "beyond the courts' competence."9 8
In contrast to Justice Scalia, who agreed with the judgment but
disagreed with how the majority arrived at the judgment through
application of the endorsement test, Justice Breyer wrote separately to
express agreement with the majority's endorsement test approach to the
Establishment Clause question, which considered the government's
neutrality with respect to religion as just one relevant, though weighty,
factor in determining whether the school's policy violated the Establishment Clause.'9 9 However, unlike the majority, Breyer did not believe
that, given the procedural posture of the Court, it could resolve the
Establishment Clause issue. °° As he explained, the case was before
the Court on appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the school board." 1 Therefore, the Court's decision to
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment should have sent
the case back to the lower court for development of the factual record on
the issue of an Establishment Clause violation, specifically on the
question of whether a child participating in the Good News Club's
activities could reasonably perceive the school's permission for the club
to use its facilities as an endorsement of religion.0 2 To answer this
question, Justice Breyer said the district court should have been allowed
to consider other specific facts like the time of day, the age of the
children, and the nature of the meetings.20 3 In Justice Breyer's view,
only after presentation of these facts could the Court resolve the
*
204
issue.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, called for the Court to group speech for
religious purposes into three categories.2 5 The first category would be
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197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at 126-27.
at 127.
at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring).
at 128-29.
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"religious speech that is simply speech about a particular topic from a
religious point of view."2" 6 So long as speech in this category addresses
one of the limited forum's authorized topics, the government may not
restrict it.20 7 The second category would be "religious speech that
amounts to worship, or its equivalent."2 8 The third category would be
religious speech "aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief
in a particular religious faith."20 9 Justice Stevens argued that the
government could restrict speech in the latter two categories under its
authority to control access to a limited public forum on the basis of
subject matter "so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum. " 21°
According to Justice Stevens, the speech at issue in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District, 1 which the majority cited
in support of its holding,212 fell squarely into the first category, speech
about a particular topic from a religious point of view.213 Because the
subject matter of Lamb's Chapel's speech fell within one of the limited
public forum's list of authorized topics, the speech could not be restricted
because such a restriction would be based solely on viewpoint. 4 In
contrast, the religious speech in this case, Justice Stevens contended,
arguably fell within the second category, religious speech that amounts
to worship, and it also quite clearly fell within the third category,
religious speech aimed at proselytizing a belief in a particular religious
faith.2"' Because the speech at issue in this case fell in a different
category than the speech at issue in Lamb's Chapel, the holding in
Lamb's Chapel should not have controlled this case.21 6
The last dissenting opinion was penned by Justice Souter. Like
Justice Breyer, Justice Souter contended that the majority should never
have ruled on the Establishment Clause issue because the lower courts,
which upheld the school board's policy on the grounds that it did not
violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, never reached
this issue. 217 However, unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Souter did not

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 131 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
211. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
212. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107-110.
213. Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 132-34.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 139-40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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concur with the majority's decision to reverse the lower court's ruling
that the school board's policy constituted a viewpoint-based restriction
on speech.21 Like Justice Stevens, Justice Souter viewed the school
board's policy, which provides "school premises shall not be used ... for
religious purposes," as a reasonable viewpoint neutral-restriction on the
scope of permitted subject matter and activities in the designated public
forum.2 19 In determining that the subject matter and activities of the
club's meetings fell beyond the scope of the forum's authorized topics,
Justice Souter stated, "It is beyond question that [the club] intended to
use the public school premises not for the mere discussion of a subject
from a particular, Christian point of view, but for an evangelical service
of worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of Christian
conversion."22 ° Moreover, in an eerily prescient statement, Justice
Souter warned that as a result of the Court's decision, "any public school
opened for civic meetings must be opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque."22 1
As for the Establishment Clause issue, Justice Souter bemoaned the
majority's refusal to remand the issue for further proceedings.222 He
argued that the record was too scant for the Court to resolve the
*
223
issue.
In Justice Souter's view, there were enough facts to suggest
that a reasonable person could perceive an endorsement of religion so
that a grant of summary judgment was inappropriate.224 Nevertheless,
because the majority ruled on the Establishment Clause issue, Justice
Souter reluctantly offered his analysis based on the meager record before
the Court.225
In his analysis, Justice Souter applied the endorsement test and asked
whether the school board's actions under these circumstances would lead
a reasonable observer to perceive the school as endorsing a religion.226
Unlike the majority, which, Justice Souter described, "conclud[ed] that
such an endorsement effect [was] out of the question ... because the
context here [was] 'materially indistinguishable' from the facts in Lamb's
Chapel and Widmar,"22 7 Justice Souter saw the context as distinguishable enough to make the issue of whether a reasonable observer would

218.
219.
220.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
(1985)).

Id. at 134-39.
Id. at 135-37 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 906-07.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 906-07.
Id. at 907-10.
Id. at 910.
Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,806
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perceive government endorsement of religion at least disputable.228 In
contrast to the university students in Widmar v. Vincent,2 29 the
students at Milford were far more young and impressionable and,
therefore, not as capable of appreciating the school's policy of neutrality
toward religion. 3 ° Furthermore, unlike in Widmar, where so many
different religious and nonreligious student groups used the forum at
issue that a "reasonable college observer" could not see "government
endorsement in any one" of the groups, the record showed that at the
school in this case, only four outside groups met in the school, and just
one, the Good News Club, met immediately after the end of the school
day.2 ' In fact, the Club's meetings followed the end of regular school
activities so closely that its members had to wait for the room to clear
before beginning their activities.23 2 In Justice Souter's opinion, given
the age of the students, the small number of groups meeting regularly
in the forum, and the "temporal and physical continuity" of the clubs'
meetings, there was a very real possibility that a reasonable observer
would perceive the school as endorsing the club's activities-a possibility
that deserved further exploration and analysis by the trial court."
VI.
DID GOOD NEWS CLUB V. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL ESTABLISH
A DICHOTOMY BETWEEN WORSHIP AND SPEECH ADDRESSING A SECULAR
TOPIC FROM A RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE? THE SECOND AND NINTH
CIRCUITS ANSWER: 'YES!"

A. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Faith Center Church
Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover
In Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover,234 Contra
Costa County (the "County") made its public library meeting rooms
available to the public for "educational, cultural[,] and community
related meetings, programs[,] and activities." 235 This access was
subject to a number of mostly content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions such as an application form and a use fee if the meeting was
not open to the general public. 23"
However, one restriction was

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 141-45.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 142-43.
Id. at 143-44.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 144-45.
480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 902.
Id. at 902-03.

1346

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

content-based, providing
that library meeting rooms "shall not be used
23 1
services."
religious
for
Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries ("Faith Center") sought
and received approval to use a library meeting room to host two events
in May and July 2004.238 The May event included a morning "Wordshop" where attendees received instruction on how to "pray fervent,
effectual Prayers that God hears and answers," and an afternoon "Praise
and Worship" service that featured a sermon by the group's pastor, Dr.
Hattie Mae Hopkins, as well as prayer and songs of praise.2 39 The
County decided that the afternoon session violated its "Religious Use"
policy, informed Faith Center representatives that they were no longer
permitted to "use the meeting room for religious activities," and removed
Faith Center's July event from the calendar.24 °
In response to the County's actions, Pastor Hopkins and Faith Center
brought a suit against the County in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California. 241 Faith Center claimed that the
County's decision to deny it access to the library's meeting rooms for its
"Praise and Worship" meeting was viewpoint discrimination that
violated its First Amendment right to free speech.2 42 To remedy this
claimed violation of its First Amendment right, Faith Center sought an
injunction to enjoin the County from prohibiting the "Praise and
Worship" meeting.2 43
Because a court cannot issue a permanent
injunction until after a full trial, Faith Center moved for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the County from barring its access to the meeting
rooms until afer a full resolution of the case.244 The district court
granted the preliminary injunction upon finding that Faith Center's
First Amendment challenge was likely to succeed on the merits. The
County appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.245
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to grant the
preliminary injunction and remanded the case.246 A majority of the
court did not view the County's policy as viewpoint discriminatory but

237. Id. at 903.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 903-04 (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. at 904.
241. Id.; Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, No. C04-03 11 1JSW, 2005
WL 1220947 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2005).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 904.
243. Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 904.
244. Id. at 902.
245. Id. at 905.
246. Id. at 919.
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rather as a subject matter limitation that was reasonable in light of the
purpose of the limited forum.247 To reach this conclusion, the court
engaged in a four-step analysis. In the first step, the court determined
whether Faith Center's religious services constituted speech that was
subject to First Amendment protection.2 48 Under the authority of
Widmar v.Vincent,24 9 the court determined that Faith Center engaged
in protected speech.25 ° In the second step, the court determined the
type of forum involved. 1 The court held that the library meeting
rooms were nonpublic fora that the County had intentionally opened for
the discussion of certain topics and were, therefore, limited public
fora. 52 As limited public fora, the government could impose restrictions on access so long as they were viewpoint neutral and "'reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum.'"253
In the third step, the court determined whether the limitations on
expressive activity were reasonable for preserving the limited public
forum for the purposes for which it was dedicated.2 4 The County's
stated purpose in opening these meeting rooms was to provide a place
for "meetings, programs, or activities of educational, cultural[,] or
community interest."2 5
To preserve these meeting rooms for that
purpose, the County did not allow schools to regularly use the meeting
rooms for fear they would be converted into classrooms, nor did the
County allow religious groups to conduct services there for fear that the
meeting rooms might be converted into houses of worship. 256 Not only
did the County believe that these restrictions would prevent the
conversion of meeting rooms into classrooms and houses of worship, the
County also believed that these restrictions would help to ensure that
the library remained "a sanctuary for reading, writing, and quiet
contemplation."25 7
The County feared that religious services, in

247. Id. at 918.
248. Id. at 906-07.
249. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
250. Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 906-07.
251. Id. at 907-10.
252. Id. at 910.
253. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,806
(1985)).
254. Id. at 910-11.
255. Id. at 908 (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id. at 910.
257. Id. at 911. The dissent argued that content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions could ensure that the library remained a place for quiet contemplation and
reading:
[Tihe County would be able to enforce reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions, applicable to all groups using the meeting room, in order to maintain
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particular, could stir controversy and create a distraction, thus
detracting from the library's interest in remaining "'a place dedicated to
quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty."'258 The court concluded that these
restrictions were reasonable in light of the purposes served by the
library meeting room, 9
In the fourth step, the court assessed whether the County's policy was
viewpoint discriminatory, which would be presumed impermissible, or
subject matter-discriminatory, which would be permissible if reasonable
in light of the purposes of the limited public forum.260 Unlike the
district court, which found the library policy viewpoint discriminatory,
the court of appeals concluded that the County's policy prohibiting the
use of the meeting rooms for religious purposes was a viewpoint-neutral
subject matter restriction that was reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum.2"'
In reaching this last conclusion, the court of appeals addressed two
arguments advanced by Faith Center. Faith Center's first argument was
that the "prohibition on religious worship services [was] impermissible
viewpoint discrimination because 'prayer, praise and worship' [was] an
educational, cultural, and community-related activity that ha[d] been
Faith
suppressed due to Faith Center's religious perspective."26 2
Center's second argument was that the court could not draw a "judicially
enforceable distinction" between Faith Center's religious worship and
other religious speech permitted in the forum and that an attempt to do
so would "entangle the government with religion in a manner forbidden
by the Establishment Clause."26 3
Addressing the first argument, the court of appeals noted that in both
United States Supreme Court cases cited by Faith Center, Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District2 4 and Good
News Club v. Milford Central School,265 the groups did not seek access

the academic atmosphere of the remaining library space .... Certainly the
County could place a reasonable restriction on the number of times any group may
use the meeting room within a one or two month span, thus alleviating the
County's fear that the library meeting room will become a permanent house of
worship.
Id. at 931 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
258. Id. at 909, 911 (majority opinion) (quoting Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142
(1966)).
259. Id. at 911.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 911, 915.
262. Id. at 911-12.
263. Id. at 912.
264. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
265. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
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to the limited forum to conduct worship services but rather to engage in
activities and discussion from a religious perspective on the same subject
matter as secular groups who already had access to the forum.266
Moreover, the court of appeals noted that in Good News Club, the Court
considered whether that religion oriented club's activities constituted a
worship service." 7 Not only did the Court reject that characterization
of the club's activities, but it also regarded the distinction between
discussion of an authorized topic from a religious perspective and
worship as relevant, which the court of appeals believed was indicated
by the footnote in the Good News Club opinion that stated, "'[We
conclude that the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious
worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values."'268 The court of
appeals argued this language suggested that if the Court had found the
club's activities to constitute worship, then the Court would have held
that the club's activities "exceeded the boundaries of [the] forum,"
making a prohibition of the club's meetings a permissible subject matter
restriction rather than an impermissible viewpoint-based restriction.2 69
The court of appeals noted with approval that the County's application
of its meeting room policy showed that the county recognized this
distinction between religious worship and discussion of an authorized
topic from a religious perspective. ° The County did not prohibit
Faith Center from carrying on its "Wordshop" meeting in which
participants discussed how to communicate effectively with God. 1
The County recognized this speech as addressing the authorized subject
matter of "communication" and, therefore, did not attempt to prohibit
it. 2712 Likewise, the County never tried to restrict other Faith Center
activities that served the forum's purpose, such as discussions about the
Bible and various social and political issues.273
As for Faith Center's second argument-that religious worship cannot
be distinguished from other forms of religious speech-the court of
appeals held that not only could religious worship be distinguished from
other forms of religious speech, but also Faith Center had indeed drawn
the distinction itself when it separated the "Wordshop" meeting from the
Thus, Faith Center seemed to
"Praise and Worship" meeting.2 4

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 912-14.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 915 n.14 (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4).
Id. at 913, 915.
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916-19.
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contradict itself. While Faith Center seemed to easily distinguish praise
and worship from other religious speech in the titles for its meetings and
in various flyers and other statements, it nevertheless contended, relying
on Justice Powell's opinion in Widmar, that the distinction between
religious worship and speech on a topic from a religious viewpoint had
no "intelligible content."275 The court of appeals observed that Justice
Powell's statement appeared "[in dicta that was not central to the
Court's holding."276 Moreover, the court of appeals noted, in an
argument reminiscent of Justice White's dissenting opinion in Widmar,
that the Supreme Court, in cases concerning government speech, often
draws such distinctions, so the distinction should
not become impossible
2 77
to draw when private speech is concerned.
In the end, the court of appeals held that excluding religious worship
from the limited forum was a reasonable subject matter restriction in
light of the purposes served by the forum and that religious worship was
distinguishable from other forms of religious speech. 27'
Having
reached these conclusions, the court of appeals reversed the district
2 79
court's grant of a preliminary injunction and remanded the case.
The district court, on remand, was to craft a new injunction that would
allow the County to prohibit religious worship but enjoin the County
from restricting religious speech pertaining to the limited public forum's
range of authorized topics.2"'
In Judge Karlton's concurrence, he asserted that, despite the Supreme
Court's reluctance to do so, the structure of the First Amendment
compels the Ninth Circuit to distinguish religious speech from secular
speech.21 He stated that the division of the First Amendment into
distinct clauses made it clear that religious speech was "categorically
different than secular speech and is subject to analysis under the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause[s] without regard to the
jurisprudence of free speech."28 2
As for the oft-heard argument that an intelligible distinction cannot
be drawn between religious speech and speech from a religious
viewpoint, Judge Karlton responded

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

917.
916.
917.
918.
919.
918-19.
919 (Karlton, J., concurring).
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It may be that the majority of the Supreme Court really has doubt
about the ability to distinguish between religious practice and secular
speech. If so, they need only leave their chambers, go out in the street
and ask the first person they meet whether in the instant case the
conduct is religious in character. It is simply untenable to insist that
there is no difference between a prayer and ... political speech. To
coin a phrase, one can only pray for the court's enlightenment.8 3
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tallman contended that the County
had not excluded Faith Center from the limited forum on the basis of
subject matter but rather on the basis of viewpoint. 2
Moreover, he
determined there were many flaws in the majority's reasoning that led
the majority to the conclusion that Faith Center's expressive activities
were distinguishable on the basis of subject matter from the forum's
permitted activities.8 5
As Judge Tallman saw it, the chief flaw in the majority's reasoning
was its assertion that the court could draw a line between religious
worship and other religious speech." 6
Unlike the majority, Judge
Tallman did not believe the judiciary could distinguish between speech
on a secular topic from a religious perspective and religious worship.287
Furthermore, he pointed out that despite the majority's bold claim that
such a distinction was both possible to make and necessary, the court in
this case never actually distinguished worship from speech on a secular
topic from a religious viewpoint. 2
Instead, in Judge Tallman's view,
the court took the easy way out and relied on the fact that a flyer issued
by Faith Center proclaimed its meeting to be a service of worship. 8 9
However, Judge Tallman raised the possibility that in the wake of this
decision, future groups might be more coy about their purposes, making
it harder for the court to distinguish worship from speech on a secular
topic from a religious viewpont. 2 °
The majority's
opinion, Judge
291
Tallman noted, never addressed this possibility.

283. Id. at 920.
284. Id. at 921 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 922 ("[W]orship cannot logically be parsed from all other forms of religious
expression in the way the County intends.").
288. Id. at 924.
289. Id. at 922.
290. Id. ("The next religious group wishing to intermingle worship activities,
admonished as to the consequences of such advertising, may not be so explicit about its
meeting itinerary, or may simply call its worship activities religious 'proselytizing,' an
acceptable form of speech under the policy according to the court.").
291. Id.
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Even if the court could draw a distinction between worship and other
religious speech, Judge Tallman argued that any attempt to "parse
religious worship from other religious speech" would lead to the
entanglement problems that the Establishment Clause seeks to
avoid.29 2 The government, looking at the innumerable forms of
religious service, would have to determine which words or acts constitute
worship."' Such an inquiry would entangle the government in the
religious practices of citizens "in a manner that violates the First
Amendment."294
Assuming a distinction could be drawn between religious worship and
other religious speech, Judge Tallman argued that the County's policy
was nonetheless facially invalid because it did not provide a County
librarian with the "proper guidelines" for determining when permitted
religious speech crossed the line into prohibited religious worship.295
Instead, the policy left this determination almost completely to the
discretion of a county official. 96 As Judge Tallman observed, under
the County's policy, "[T]he power to decide the definition of a religious
service lies squarely in the lap of government officials, and that is the
crux of the problem."29 7
Finally, Judge Tallman asserted that one last flaw in the majority's
reasoning was its presumption that religious worship is a category of
speech with distinct content that "contains no particular viewpoint on
otherwise permissible secular topics."29 Judge Tallman argued that,
on the contrary, exploration of secular topics, like community and moral
character, pervades religious worship. 99 If Faith Center's worship
services addressed these permissible subjects, then exclusion of this
speech could not be characterized as anything other than viewpoint
discrimination. °° According to Judge Tallman, the way that Faith
Center expresses its viewpoint, through prayer and sermon rather than
lecture and discussion, seemed to be the true basis for the County's
decision to exclude Faith Center from the forum, not the subject matter
that its meetings addressed.''

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 924.
at 925.
at 925-26.
at 926.
at 926-27.
at 927-28.
at 928.
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B. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: Bronx Household of
Faith v. Board of Education of New York
In 1994 Bronx Household of Faith ("Bronx Household") began a long
legal battle with the Board of Education of the City of New York ("the
Board") and Community School District No. 10 (the "School District")
over access to Anne Cross Mersereau Middle School for Sunday morning
meetings.0 2 The Board originally denied Bronx Household a permit
for the use of school property citing Standard Operating Procedure
("SOP") section 5.9, a policy of the Board that barred outside organizations from conducting "religious services or religious instruction on
school premises after school." 33 Bronx Household brought suit against
the Board to challenge its decision to deny Bronx Household a permit.30 4

This case, Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School

District No. 10,305 which later became known as Bronx Household I,
reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit where
the court upheld the district court's decision in favor of the Board and
the School District.0 6 The court of appeals determined that Bronx
Household's religious worship services were distinctly different from
discussion of secular topics from a religious perspective and that this
distinction was based on subject matter rather than viewpoint.30 7
Having determined that the government could make a subject matter
distinction between worship and other speech, the court next analyzed
whether this exclusion was reasonable in light of the purposes of the
forum. 0 8 The court held that excluding Bronx Household's religious
worship services from the forum was reasonable in light of the purpose
30 9
of the limited public forum.

Then, in 2001 the Supreme Court decided Good News Club, and Bronx
Household subsequently reapplied for a permit.1 0 Once again, the

302. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. (Bronx Household III), 492 F.3d
89, 92 (2d. Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
303. Id.; Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10 (Bronx Household ), 127
F.3d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
304. Bronx HouseholdIII, 492 F.3d at 92 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Bronx Household
1, 127 F.3d at 209.
305. 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997).
306. Bronx HouseholdIII, 492 F.3d at 92 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Bronx Household
I, 127 F.3d at 217.
307. Bronx Household I, 127 F.3d at 214-15.
308. Id. at 215.
309. Id.
310. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 93 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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Board denied Bronx Household a permit.3" Bronx Household brought
a new action against the Board, and its new challenge to the School
District's permit denial and to SOP section 5.11 (numbered SOP section
5.09 in Bronx Household I)-which guided the Board's decision-was
successful.312 The court found that in both Bronx Household I and
Good News Club, the limited public forums were opened to discussions
on the topic of moral values, and the activities of Bronx Household were
indistinguishable from those in Good News Club. 3
Therefore, the
court held that the School District's denial of Bronx Household's
application for a permit constituted viewpoint discrimination, and the
court issued a preliminary injunction to enjoin the School District from
denying Bronx Household's request to rent space in the school. 314 The
court's opinion, however, emphasized that its ruling was "confined to the
district court's finding that the activities plaintiffs have proposed for
their Sunday meetings are not simply religious worship, divorced from
any teaching of moral values or other activities permitted in the
forum." 1 5 This language sounded a warning that if Bronx Household's
activities were found in the future to be worship not addressing any of
the forum's permissible topics, the School District could exclude Bronx
Household from the forum.
The decisions in Good News Club and Bronx Household If opened New
York City public school facilities to religious groups. 1
To many
churches and religious groups in New York, in a city with a paucity of
adequate meeting spaces and high property values, renting an unused
classroom in one of the city's public schools was an appealing solution.31 ' As the New York times reported, two dozen churches and
religious groups began to meet regularly in the city's public schools.31 8
The presence of these religious groups began to concern parents,
neighbors, and city administrators who feared that having a school

311. Id.
312. Id.; Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. (Bronx Household I/), 331
F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003).
313. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 93 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Bronx Household
II, 331 F.3d at 354.
314. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 93 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Bronx Household
II, 331 F.3d at 357.
315. Bronx Household I1,331 F.3d at 354.
316. Benjamin Weiser & Susan Saulny, On Sundays, Hymn Books Replace Textbooks
in City Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2005, available at http://nytimes.com/2005/02/06/
nyregion/06church.html.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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identified with a particular church could confuse young children.3 19
One incident of particular concern to parents and city administrators
occurred at a school in Battery Park City, where members of a church
that held weekly services in the school helped subsidize the PTA's backto-school party and handed out balloons with crosses on them.3 20 This
incident seemed to be the fulfillment of Justice Souter's prediction in his
Good News Club dissent that the result of the Supreme Court's decision
in that case would be the conversion of public schools into houses of
worship.32 '
Motivated by this concern that the activities of religious groups using
school facilities could cause young children to associate these schools
with the particular religious groups that used school facilities, the Board
modified SOP section 5.11 in its operating manual to provide, "No permit
shall be granted for the purpose of holding religious worship services, or
322
otherwise using a school as a house of worship."
Bronx Household
challenged this policy revision and asked the court to convert its
preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction.323 The district
court, which concluded that this new policy was viewpoint discriminatory, granted Bronx Household's motion for summary judgment and
permanently enjoined the Board from excluding Bronx Household from
school premises.324
On appeal to the Second Circuit, a three-judge panel took three
different approaches.325
In Judge Calabresi's opinion, the Board's
exclusion of Bronx Household's worship services was a viewpoint-neutral
subject matter-based restriction that was reasonable in light of the
purposes of the limited public forum; therefore, he concluded that the
district court's permanent injunction and grant of summary judgment
should be reversed.3 26 In Judge Leval's opinion, the issue was not yet
ripe for adjudication and therefore, the district court's decision should be

319. Id. " We are concerned about having public schools used by religious congregations as houses of worship,' said Lisa Grumet, a senior lawyer in the city's corporation
counsel's office, who added that the city believes the practice violates the traditional
separation of church and state." Id.
320. Id.
321. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 139 (Souter, J., dissenting).
322. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 94 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
323. Id. at 95.
324. Id. For a good discussion of this case, see Kevin Fiet, Note, The Bronx Household
of Faith: Looking at the Unanswered Questions, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 153 (2007).
325. Bronx Household II, 492 F.3d at 90-91 (per curiam).
326. Id. at 106 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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vacated.327 Finally, Judge Walker concluded that the Board's exclusion
was viewpoint discriminatory, just as the district court found, and
therefore, he determined that the district court's decision should be
affirmed.32
Due to the positions taken by the judges, there were
neither enough votes to reverse nor affirm the district court's decision.
Thus, the district court's decision was vacated and remanded for further
development.329
Leaving aside Judge Leval's opinion addressing the ripeness of this
case for adjudication, the debate between Judge Calabresi and Judge
Walker offers fascinating insight into the opposing views on the
questions of whether the court can make a subject matter-based
distinction between worship and speech on a topic from a religious
perspective.33 ° Judge Calabresi, in reaching his decision, engaged in
an analysis similar to the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Faith Center
Church. First, Judge Calabresi identified the type of forum involved.33 1 In previous cases involving the parties, the court had
identified the forum as a limited public forum, and because no material
change in facts required any reconsideration of these holdings, Judge
Calabresi determined that the school was a limited public forum.332
As a limited public forum, the Board could discriminate on the basis of
subject matter in order to preserve the purposes of the limited forum,
but it could not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. 3
Having identified the forum involved and recognizing that the nature
of the forum affected the constitutionality of any speech restrictions,
Judge Calabresi analyzed how the Supreme Court had distinguished

327. Id. at 123 (Leval, J., concurring).
328. Id. at 123-24 (Walker, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 91 (per curiam).
330. Id. at 106-23 (Calabresi, J., concurring). Judge Leval helds that this case was not
ripe for adjudication. Id. at 123 (Leval, J., concurring). He argued that until the city
invoked the new SOP section 5.11 to deny Bronx Household a permit, the court should
refrain from passing judgment on the constitutionality of the new rule. Id. at 115-16.
Judge Calebresi acknowledged that the ripeness question was "a close one" because some
parts of the record indicated that the modification had been merely proposed, while other
parts of the record indicated that the Board had already adopted the modification. Id. at
95 n.2 (Calabresi, J., concurring). In the end, however, Judge Calabresi concluded that this
dispute was ripe for two reasons. Id. First, he noted that the trial court's conclusion was
that the new SOP section 5.11 was adopted and that this finding should not be overturned
unless it was clearly erroneous. Id. Second, he asserted that the preliminary injunction
in place hampered the Board's ability to enforce the new SOP section 5.11 and created the
sort of direct legal effect that is necessary to ripen a dispute. Id.
331. Id. at 97-98 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 97.

2008]

DEFINING WORSHIP

1357

viewpoint discrimination from subject matter discrimination.334 Judge
Calabresi observed that in Lamb's Chapel and Good News Club, the
Court determined that the groups the government was trying to exclude
from the forum wished to engage in speech addressing permissible
subject matter from a religious viewpoint. 3 5 In neither case did the
Court conclude that the groups seeking access wished to engage in
religious worship or other speech with no pertinence to the topics for
which the limited public forums involved were created.3
Moreover,
like the Ninth Circuit noted in Faith Center Church,"' Judge Calabresi observed that a footnote in the majority opinion in Good News
Club338 suggested the outcome of that case would have been different
if the Court had determined the group was conducting a service of
worship rather than engaging in a discussion about permissible subject
matter from a religious viewpoint.3 9
If the Supreme Court's decision hinged, at least in part, on the
determination that the activities of the Good News Club did not
constitute "'mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral
values,'" the question then remained: What is "mere religious worship"?3 40 Judge Calabresi phrased the question: "Is [worship] an
approach to or a way of considering an otherwise permitted subject of
discussion, or is it a unique subject?" 4 1 Judge Calabresi answered
that worship is a unique subject and that Bronx Household used
religious worship not as a way to approach subjects within the scope
of
34 2
the forum's permitted topics, but "expressly for worship in itself."
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Calabresi, like the Ninth Circuit in
Faith Center Church, observed that the party challenging its exclusion
343
from the forum had described its own activities as religious worship.
In fact, Bronx Household not only described its activities as religious
worship but also took pains to distinguish its activities from those of
other groups in the forum.344 The head of the Bronx Household
congregation, Pastor Hall, distributed an article that said, unlike the
other groups in the forum, "'the church [is a covenant community"' and

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 99-100.
Id.
480 F.3d at 915 n.14.
533 U.S. at 112 n.4.
Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 100 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
Id. at 101 (emphasis added) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4).
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 101-02.
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is "'not a group of people who have a common interest in the same way
3 45
that stamp collecting and coin collecting bring people together.'
Pastor Hall explained that while Boy Scouts might have rituals, Bronx
Household "'engage[d] in the teaching and preaching of the word of
God"' and administered the "'sacraments of baptism and the Lord's
[Slupper.' 346 Like the Ninth Circuit in Faith Center Church, Judge
Calabresi based his decision on the challengers' own description of their
activities as religious worship and did not attempt to fashion a definition
of worship that might be applied to a group in the future that did not
choose to describe its activities as worship. 47
Having determined that Bronx Household's activities were within the
"worship" category of speech, Judge Calabresi next assessed whether this
viewpoint-neutral, subject matter-based restriction was reasonable. 48
To decide this issue, Judge Calabresi looked to the Second Circuit's
decision in Bronx Household J.34' He stated that in Bronx Household
I, the Second Circuit held that the old version of SOP section 5.11 was
viewpoint-neutral and that the subject matter-based restriction was
reasonable. ° Furthermore, Judge Calabresi explained, the Supreme
Court in Good News Club reversed the Second Circuit's decision in Bronx
Household I because it concluded, in direct contrast to the Second
Circuit's determination, that section 5.11 was in fact viewpoint
discriminatory. 351 The Court never reached the issue of whether a
viewpoint-neutral subject matter-based exclusion of religious worship
from the forum would be constitutional.3 2 Because the decision in
Good News Club did not affect the Second Circuit's holding that a
viewpoint-neutral subject matter-based restriction on worship is
constitutional, Judge Calabresi argued that the court of appeals
remained bound by it. 3 3 Therefore, because the new section 5.11 was
viewpoint neutral, Judge Calabresi argued that the court was bound by
Bronx Household I and concluded that the restriction was reasonable in
light of the purposes of the limited public forum. 5 4
Judge Walker, in his dissenting opinion, argued that one glaring flaw
in Judge Calabresi's analysis was his focus on comparing the expressive

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 103 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

at 104-05.
(citing Bronx Household 1, 127 F.3d at 214).
at 105.

at 105, 106.
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activity of other groups in the forum to the expressive activity of Bronx
Household. 355 According to Judge Walker, Judge Calebresi merely
looked at the expressive activities of other groups who were granted
access to the forum and concluded that because none of those groups
engaged in religious worship, worship was not a permitted subject
matter. 5
Instead of comparing the expressive activity already
permitted in the forum to that proposed by Bronx Household, Judge
Walker contended that the court should compare the purposes of Bronx
Household's activity to the purposes of the activities allowed in the
forum.35 7 Under that approach, Judge Walker determined the school's
purpose in creating the limited public forum was to "foster a community
in their geographic vicinity in ways that will inure to [the school's]
benefit."3 8 Judge Walker contended that Bronx Household's expressive activities aligned with this purpose, because "Bronx Household's
essential purpose is the development of a community of believers, which
has as its anticipated result increased community support for the
'
school."359
Because Judge Walker determined that the purpose of
Bronx Household's expressive activities fit within the purposes for which
the Board created the limited public forum, he asserted that any effort
to exclude Bronx Household should trigger "more searching scrutiny" of
the Board's motives.36 °
In addition, Judge Walker disagreed with Judge Calabresi's conclusion
that the court of appeals was bound by its determination in Bronx
Household I that the school created a limited public forum."' Justice
Walker argued that "the character of a forum is defined by its uses and
the uses to which it is put change over time."362 Only if the character
of the forum remained unchanged would the court be bound by the
decision in Bronx Household 1.363 Whether the character of the forum
was unchanged could only have been determined through a factual
inquiry, but such an inquiry was never conducted. 3 '
Therefore,
Justice Walker argued that the case should have been remanded for a

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Id. at 124 (Walker, J., dissenting).
Id.

Id.
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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factual inquiry into the current character of the forum in order to
ascertain whether it remained a limited public forum.365
Most of all, Judge Walker adamantly disagreed with the proposition
in Judge Calabresi's opinion that a judge could define worship. 6 In
Judge Walker's opinion, judges are not "competent to offer a legal
definition of religious worship."3 67 Judge Walker noted that even if a
judge could define worship, Judge Calabresi never defined it. 36s Judge
Calabresi's decision to place Bronx Household's expressive activities in
the worship category was based mostly on the admission by the group's
pastor that Bronx Household intended to conduct worship services.36 9
According to Judge Walker, Judge Calabresi's decision left unanswered
the question of what the court should do in the future with groups that
are not ready to "'make [the] nice admission' that they wish to engage
in 'worship."'3 70
VII. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE: THE COURSE SET BY THE DECISIONS IN
FAITH CENTER CHURCH AND BRONX HOUSEHOLD III WILL LEAD TO
STATE ENTANGLEMENT WITH RELIGION

In Good News Club v.Milford Central School3 7 the United States
Supreme Court held that once the government has established a limited
public forum for the discussion of a range of topics, it may not exclude
37 2
a group that addresses these topics from a religious point of view.
This rule worked well in Good News Club because, although the group
engaged in certain activities that many persons (among them Justice
Souter) might consider to be religious worship, the substance of the

365. Id.
366. Id. at 129.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 130.
370. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v.
Glover, 462 F.3d 1194, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006)). Justice Walker, like the dissenting opinion
in Faith Center Church, also argued that a legal definition of worship would lead to
government entanglement in religion and give too much discretion to state officials:
[A]ny attempt to define worship places Judge Calabresi upon the horns of a
dilemma. Either he clarifies the meaning of "worship," and risks entangling the
judiciary in religious controversy in violation of the First Amendment, or he
delegates the task of flouting the Establishment Clause to the Board, which will
no doubt have to "interpret religious doctrine or defer to the interpretations of
religious officials" in order to keep worship, and worship alone, out of its schools.
Id. at 131 (Walker J., dissenting) (quoting Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v.
Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 427 (2d Cir. 2002)).
371.
372.

533 U.S. 98 (2001).
Id. at 111-12.
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373
group's activities pertained to one of the forum's permitted topics.
However, the question remains whether the government can exclude a
group whose expressive activities "constitute mere religious worship
divorced from any" discussion related to the limited forum's permitted
374
topics.
Both the Second Circuit, in Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of
and the Ninth
Education of New York (Bronx Household III),
76
Circuit, in Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover
have answered that such a group may be excluded. 7 Moreover, in an
effort to comply with the Supreme Court's clear stricture that the
government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, these two
courts have held that this exclusion was based on the subject matter of
the speech, not on viewpoint. 8' Thus, both the Second and Ninth
Circuits held that a subject matter distinction may be drawn between
worship and speech addressing a secular topic from a religious perspective.
Yet, while both courts held that such a distinction was legally relevant
and determined that the government could exclude these groups from
the limited public forum because their activities were religious worship,
neither the court in Faith Center Church nor the court in Bronx
Household III announced a test for determining whether a speech
activity is worship or speech addressing a secular topic from a religious
perspective. Instead, both courts relied on statements or documents in
which the groups labeled their own activities as worship.3 8 Therefore,
these cases only provide guidance for future cases in which the parties
conveniently label their own activities as worship. For those parities
that do not provide such convenient labels or admissions, these decisions
offer little useful guidance.
The decisions in Faith Center Church and Bronx Household III
possibly represent a halfway step. Now that worship is recognized in
the Second and Ninth Circuits as a distinguishable subject matter, the

373. Id. at 112 n.4.
374. Id.
375. 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
376. 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2007).
377. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 914-15 (9th Cir.
2007); Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 98 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
378. Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 910; Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 102-03
(Calabresi, J., concurring).
379. Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 910; Bronx Household II, 492 F.3d at 102-03
(Calabresi, J., concurring).
380. Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 916; Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 103
(Calabresi, J., concurring).
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stage is set for a case that will force these courts to establish a legal
definition of worship. One concept is clear: the case will have to be one
where the group involved does not label its own activities as worship,
thus forcing the court to ascertain from the facts presented whether the
expressive activities at issue were worship. Otherwise, the courts will
likely fall back on their decisions in these two cases and avoid articulating a definition.
With this last step looming for these courts, the question is: "What is
worship?" As mentioned above, the Second and Ninth Circuits never
articulated a legal definition of worship, but those courts did give a few
hints about what a legal definition of worship will look like. Unfortunately, these hints also suggested that the two Circuits were heading off
in conflicting directions so that the definition of worship in the Ninth
Circuit will be different from the Second Circuit. For example, in Faith
Center Church the Ninth Circuit held that a policy excluding only
religious worship was viewpoint-neutral.3 81 By contrast, in Bronx
Household III the Second Circuit held that a policy excluding only
religious worship was viewpoint discriminatory.382 The Second Circuit
determined, however, that the state could exclude all worship, both
religious and secular, from the forum.383 Such an exclusionary policy
would be viewpoint-neutral because it would envelop all perspectives on
the subject of worship. 3" This holding, however, begs the question:
"What is secular worship?" The court spent some time musing on
whether secular worship even exists. 8 5 In the end, the court concluded that secular worship does exist, but it did not define the term.8 6
Another difference is that the Ninth Circuit, unlike the Second Circuit,
conceded that it could not define religious worship.3 87 In the words of
the court: "The distinction to be drawn here is thus much more

381. Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 918.
382. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 92 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
383. Id. at 104.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
If... we treat worship as something that can also be secular, then the Board's
exclusion of religious (as against secular) worship is clearly invalid. But the
second part of the Board's regulation, which bars use of the school as a house of
worship, nevertheless remains in force. For it excludes religious and secular
worship alike. Assuming arguendo, therefore, that secular worship exists, that
provision does not distinguish between religious and secular approaches, but
instead bars the whole category. Accordingly, it constitutes content rather than
viewpoint discrimination.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
387. Faith Ctr. Church, 480 F.3d at 918.
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challenging-one between religious worship and virtually all other forms
of religious speech-and one that the government and the courts are not
competent to make." 38 8 Instead, the court admitted that to determine
whether speech is religious worship, the court would rely entirely on the
label that the speaker puts on his or her own words. 389 This is the
implication of the following language from the court's opinion:
That distinction, however, was already made by Faith Center itself
when it separated its afternoon religious worship service from its
morning activities ....
The County may not be able to identify
whether Faith Center has engaged in pure religious worship, but Faith
Center can and did.
.....
Religious worship services can be distinguished from other
forms of religious speech by the adherents themselves. 9 '
By contrast, the Second Circuit, though it took the easier route and
relied on the label Bronx Household put on its own speech activities,
never foreclosed the possibility that worship could be found even in cases
where the party does not supply such a convenient admission.
Remarkably, although about four pages of this opinion fell under the
heading "The Category of Worship Services," nowhere in this section was
any legal definition of this category cited or announced. 391 The closest
the opinion comes to defining worship and answering the question posed
in the opinion itself, "What is worship?," is found in this brief statement:
"Worship is adoration." 392 The word "adoration" is defined as: "the act
of paying honor, as to a divine being; worship" or "the act of admiring
strongly" or "the act of worship."393 Thus, the Second Circuit's "answer" still begs the question.
As these courts head off on this course, another question should be
asked: Do we really want to go there? More precisely, will this sort of
inquiry entangle the government in the religious practices of citizens in
a way that offends both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses?394 As the dissenters in Faith Center Church and Bronx Household
III argued passionately, with support from the language in a number of
Supreme Court opinions, a legal definition of worship invites an

388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
391. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 100 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
392. Id. at 103.
393. Dictionary.com Entry on Adoration, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
adoration (last visited May 12, 2008).
394.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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intrusion into the religious practices of citizens that would surely be
unconstitutional. To illustrate, consider the distinction Justice Stevens
proposed between speech from a religious viewpoint and proselytizing
religious speech in his dissent in Good News Club.395 If the Court
were to recognize this distinction, a school could create a policy for afterschool meetings in classrooms that prohibited proselytizing. Imagine
then that the school later barred a Christian group from using the
classrooms for meetings based on allegations that religious proselytizing
was taking place at these meetings. The Christian group then challenges this denial of access and takes this case to trial. At trial, the
attorneys for the school must establish that proselytizing occurred at
these meetings, so the attorneys call members of the group to the stand.
The attorneys for the school pepper them with such questions as: Did
you ask those who came to the meetings to receive Christ as their
savior? Did you ask them to pray with you? Did you encourage them
to be baptized? These questions pry into the viewpoints of the speaker
and interfere with the right of both the conveyor of the message and the
receiver to exercise their religious faiths. As the Court noted in Widmar
v. Vincent, 396 "Merely to draw the distinction [between religious
worship and speech addressing a secular topic from a religious perspective] would require ... the courts [ to inquire into the significance of
words and practices to different religious faiths .... Such inquiries
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner
forbidden by our cases."397 Therefore, a proceeding like the hypothetical one above that inquires into the religious significance of particular
speech would surely violate the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.
As mentioned above, these cases seem to represent a halfway step.
The Supreme Court recognized worship as a distinct category of speech
but declined to offer a legal definition. Because the Ninth and Second
Circuits only went halfway, the risk that the courts under their purview
will become entangled with religion is only heightened. Without a
definition of worship to guide them, district courts are left to develop
their own definitions of the category on a case-by-case basis. Some
courts are sure to be more cavalier than others. I am almost certain
that some of the less sensitive and prudent district courts will conduct
inquiries that penetrate so deeply into the intimate details of religious
practice that an Establishment Clause violation seems unavoidable.
Not only do these decisions increase the risk of state entanglement
with religion, but what may be worse is that these decisions leave state

395. 533 U.S. at 131-32.
396. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
397. Id. at 270.
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officials and residents in these jurisdictions uncertain about what
particular expressive activities may be excluded. While state officials in
these jurisdictions know they can exclude worship from the forum on the
basis of subject matter, without a definition of worship these cases offer
little guidance on how to identify speech activities that fall within that
category. Until courts provide a definition, state officials will first have
to decide whether particular speech falls into the worship category;
exclude that speech; and then hope, after costly and time-consuming
litigation, that a court will confirm the constitutional validity of their
decision. Meanwhile, free speech will be chilled as individuals refrain
from certain expressive activities for fear that a court might categorize
these expressions as worship and permanently exclude them from a
forum. Until the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal craft a
clear, workable standard, both state officials and citizens should steel
themselves for another court battle.
While I do not believe that a workable legal definition of worship can
ever be established, I do believe that in a limited public forum the
government ought to be able to control what subject matter may be
addressed. As the Supreme Court asserted in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
3 98 "There is no question that the
Moriches Union Free School District,
[state], like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated."399 So
how can the government prevent the conversion of a limited public
forum into a church, synagogue or mosque without a legal definition of
worship?
Rather than ask whether the expressive activity is worship, the
government could instead ask whether the speech relates to the forum's
permitted topics. To use the example above, if the topic of the forum
was "Free Trade in the Americas," rather than asking whether a hymn
the attendees sang or a sacrament the attendees partook in related to
the topic of worship, the government instead should ask how those
expressive activities relate to the topic of "Free Trade in the Americas."
If the activities do not relate to the permitted categories, then the speech
is excluded without any further inquiry into which category, among the
infinite range of non-permitted categories, the speech belongs. When the
government creates a limited public forum, it should only be expected to
define the topics that may be addressed within that forum. The
government should not be expected to define the infinite number of
topics for which the forum was not opened.

398. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
399. Id. at 390.
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The other implication of this rule is that if the speech-including
religious worship-relates to one of the forum's topics, then that speech
may not be excluded. This means that for forums opened to the
discussion of topics that religious worship generally addresses, it may be
impossible to exclude religious worship.400 For instance, in Good News
40 1
Club, the forum was opened to "morals and character development."
In much of religious worship, the aim is to develop morals and character.
Because private religious worship serves this purpose, it may not be
excluded.4 °2 Similarly, in Bronx Household III, the forum was opened
for the purpose of developing community.403 There is little doubt that
the worship services that Bronx Household conducted developed a sense
of community among those who attended. Indeed, developing community
has long been a function of religious worship across nearly all sects, and
because Bronx Household's speech activities served the forum's purpose,
there was no viewpoint neutral way of excluding Bronx Household from
the forum. Perhaps the best advice to any government considering
whether to create a limited public forum but wishing to exclude religious
worship is to create a forum for a purpose that religious worship does
not serve. If the government does create a forum for a purpose that is
fulfilled by religious worship, any attempt to exclude religious worship
will constitute viewpoint discrimination. 4'

400. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111. "'[W]hen the subject matter is morals
and character, it is quixotic to attempt a distinction between religious viewpoints and
religious subject matters.'" Id. at 111 (brackets in original) (quoting Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 512 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
401. Id. at 108.
402. Judge Tallman, in his Faith Center Church dissent, made a similar observation:
Singing a religious song may very well be akin to singing about morality
according to religious tenets. Praying is usually speech containing praise to a
higher being, but may also contain personal characterizations of one's own life,
wishes, hopes, or concerns. Pastor Hopkins's sermon is the clearest example of
religious speech which expresses a viewpoint on otherwise permissible secular
topics. One can imagine the variety of subject matter that could be included in a
sermon-money, family, love, or avoiding drugs and alcohol to name a few. The list
is endless.
Instead, the opinion categorizes all of Faith Center's worship activities into one
neat box and then calls it impermissible speech. Yet it never examines the nature
of that speech.
480 F.3d at 930 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
403. Bronx Household III, 492 F.3d at 126 (Walker, J., dissenting).
404. Judge Tallman in his dissent in Faith Center Church largely shares my view:
"Common sense dictates that religious worship can include exploration of secular topics
from a religious point of view, as Faith Center's meeting demonstrates. Enforcing the
exclusion is therefore viewpoint discrimination and Faith Center has made a clear showing
of probable success on the merits of its claim." 480 F.3d at 927 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
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One potential problem with my approach is that if people engage in
religious worship in a limited public forum, there is no doubt a risk that
a reasonable observer might perceive state endorsement of a particular
religion. Under the endorsement test, private religious worship speech
on government-owned property that may be perceived by a reasonable
observer with an awareness of the history and context of the forum as
state endorsement violates the establishment clause. So, with the
approach I advocate, the question of how the government is to prevent
an Establishment Clause violation if private religious speech activities
cannot be distinguished from other speech activities remains. The
answer is that adoption of my approach must coincide with adoption of
the coercion test. As mentioned above, under the coercion test, private
religious speech in a public forum that is open to all religious speech
activities cannot violate the Establishment Clause. Instead, only state
coercion of an individual to engage in a religious activity violates the
Establishment Clause. Therefore, under the coercion test, one of the
primary justifications offered by the government for the speech
restrictions at issue in both Faith Center Church and Bronx Household
III-that is, avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation-would lose
all force. The private religious speech of both these groups simply would
not pose any risk of an Establishment Clause violation.
Note that the private religious speech of Faith Center and Bronx
Household would not violate the Establishment Clause under either
Justice Kennedy's or Justice Scalia's version of the endorsement test.
Certainly Justice Scalia's version of the test is easily met because no one
is being compelled under the force of law to attend the Faith Center or
But even under Justice Kennedy's
Bronx Household meetings.
psychological coercion test, there does not appear to be any risk that
these groups' activities will violate the Establishment Clause because
attendance is truly voluntary, and the speech that occurs at these
meetings is not under the direction or control of the government like the
Rabbi's prayer in Lee v. Weisman. 40 5 Therefore, because either version
of the coercion test would protect the speech at issue in Bronx Household
III or Faith Center Church, it is unnecessary to advocate for one test
over the other in this Comment.

405.

505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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CONCLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT MUST ACT TO CORRECT
THE NINTH AND SECOND CIRCUITS

These two cases illustrate the many issues that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School" 6 left unanswered. Foremost among them, the decision in
Good News Club did not resolve the issue of whether worship is a
subject matter or an expression of viewpoint on an array of subject
matter. Because Supreme Court precedent is clear that in a limited
public forum the government may restrict speech on the basis of subject
matter but not on viewpoint, to government officials who control access
to these forums, resolution of this issue is crucial. These officials need
to know whether their policies directed at restricting religious activities
discriminate on the basis of subject matter (and are therefore constitutionally valid) or if their policies discriminate on the basis of viewpoint
and thus violate enumerated constitutional rights in the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. °7
Moreover, the lower courts need guidance. Under the current state of
the law in these circuits, worship is recognized as a distinct category of
speech that may be restricted on the basis of subject matter, but the
boundaries of this category remain undefined. Without clearly defined
boundaries for the category, it will be the the lower courts's job to draw
the lines in the cases before them. To accomplish this task, these courts
will probe into the speech activities of individuals in order to ascertain
whether particular speech falls into the worship category. The danger
of state entanglement in religion is not only apparent but also very
distressing. Equally distressing is the chilling effect that this uncertainty may have on expressive activity in limited public forums as individuals refrain from particular speech for fear that they might stray across
the undefined line between speech on a secular topic from a religious
viewpoint and speech categorized as worship.
Because the motive most often cited by government officials for
restricting access to a limited public forum is prevention of an Establishment Clause violation, an equally important issue for the Supreme Court
to resolve is whether the endorsement test or the coercion test should
prevail as the approach to analyzing an Establishment Clause challenge.
Under the endorsement test, where private speech on government-owned
property can violate the Establishment Clause, the government will need
more authority to control private speech than it will need under the

406.
407.

533 U.S. 98 (2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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coercion test, where private speech on government-owned property can
never violate the Establishment Clause. In the last several years, the
Court has been split between Justices favoring the endorsement test and
Justices favoring the coercion test. With the departures and arrivals to
the bench, which test will prevail in the future remains an open
question.
With two of the most populous circuits reaching the conclusion, based
on vague language in a footnote, that worship is a legally distinguishable
subject matter, the Supreme Court must act now to end this confusion
before government officials infringe any further on the free exercise and
free speech rights of individuals. Whether worship is a subject matter
or an expression of a viewpoint is a question that deserves much more
than a footnote.
JOHN TYLER

